

Cicero and the Civics of Rhetoric

A Reader


Edited by Charles A. Firneno and Charles Firneno

Semper oratorum eloquentiae moderatrix fuit auditorum prudentia.

The good sense of the hearers has always governed
the eloquence of speakers.

— Cicero, Orator 24





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Edited by Charles A. Firneno and Charles Firneno

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Introduction

Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio

The bond of it is reason and speech

— Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.50

The readings that follow were born of the happy coincidence of vanity and laziness: vanity in the form of a few red Loeb Classical Library volumes of Cicero that I pretentiously leave atop the cabinet in my office behind my desk chair. They are strategically positioned to see if any of my interlocutors on Zoom or Teams calls recognize their distinctive size and color. No one ever does, which gives me smug (read petty) satisfaction. The other was the necessity to get my son, Charlie, an alternate path to credit for a civics class in his third year of high school.

Charlie loved the Roman Polanski film, *The Ghost Writer*, and he has a habit of reading the source material of his favorite movies. It so happens the novel of the same name was written by Robert Harris. Charlie liked it so much he went on to read one of Harris's historical fictions, *Imperium*, about Cicero. This, in turn, reminded him of the red books and soon two of them disappeared from my office. Later his mother told me he was reading them and laughing, so, when the small crisis arose about the civics class, voilà ... this little volume.

The design of this book had in mind the Latin student, the civics student, and the citizen, as Cicero intended. His theme is that without rhetoric, one of his three pillars of any republic along with philosophy and the law, there can be no public, that is, political speech. And without such speech there would be nothing for the citizen to hear in the manner that a republic needs. At first blush a haughty philosopher or lawyer might scoff at this seemingly unjustified elevation of verbal artifice. But as Cicero lamented, the end of the rhetor's Forum and the Republic were one and the same, and in the bombastic world contemporary to this little primer, we might take notice.

We chose to name our publishing enterprise Lectus Press because of the triple pun it supports. *Lectus* is a participle of the Latin verb “to read,” *legere*; it means “chosen” as well, since *legere* is one verb for

both; but it also means couch, as in *lectus lucubratorius*, the reclined approach to reading (and eating and just about everything else except working) that the Romans preferred and my family has assiduously practiced ever since. A true Firreno never stands when he can sit and never sits when he can recline on a *lectus*. We wish you the same good posture while reading Cicero with us.

— *Charles A. Firreno and Charles Firreno*

How to Read This Book

The texts in this book are of five kinds, and it helps to know which is which before reading any of them.

A treatise is an author speaking in his own voice to a reader: Aristotle's *Politics* and *Rhetoric*, Cicero's *De Inventione*, *Orator*, and *De Officiis*, Quintilian's *Institutio*. Aristotle's treatises are terse because they began as lecture notes for his school; Cicero's are expansive because they were written for publication among friends who would read them aloud.

A dialogue is a staged conversation. Cicero learned the form from Plato and used it for his most ambitious work — *De Re Publica*, *De Legibus*, *De Oratore*, *Brutus* — for three reasons. It let him put arguments in the mouths of the great men of the previous generation, borrowing their authority; it let him show a question from more than one side without having to settle it in his own name; and it let him set the conversation in a particular place on a particular day, so that the republic the speakers describe is also the republic they are living in, usually a few years before it fell apart. The reader should always ask who is talking and what the speaker's position was in the year the dialogue is set. Plato's *Gorgias* is a dialogue too, but of a different kind: a contest, in which Socrates takes an opponent's definition apart.

A speech was delivered to an audience that could act on it, and the book has four, all delivered or meant for the Forum, the open square at the center of Rome where the courts sat and the people assembled — the two Catilinarians, *Pro Archia*, and the Second Philippic, which was written as if delivered but never was. Everything in a speech is aimed at a particular audience on a particular day; the headnote names both.

A history is Thucydides, who reports a speech he did not hear and tells us he reconstructed it as the occasion required.

A letter is *De Officiis*, written to a son studying in Athens, which is why it is the plainest of Cicero's works.

The original languages are on the left-hand pages and the English on the right. The section numbers in the margins are the modern standard ones, by which every edition of these works is cited. The translations are old — the newest is a century old, the oldest two and a half centuries — because they are the ones that belong to everyone, and each headnote says who made it and how closely it follows the original. The Loeb translators — Keyes, Miller, Lamb, Freese, Butler, who worked for the Loeb Classical Library, the red-and-green series begun in 1912 that prints the original on the left page and an English version on the right — wrote to face the original and can be checked against it line by line; Jowett and Crawley are freer; Watson and Yonge are Victorian and faithful but long-winded; Jones, in 1776, took the liberties of his century. When the English seems to say more than the Latin, it usually does.

Part One

WHAT A REPUBLIC IS

A book about speaking in a republic has to say first what a republic is, and the answer is not obvious. Aristotle says a city is a partnership in speech about the just and the unjust. Cicero says a republic is the property of a people, and a people is a crowd that has agreed on law and shares an interest; he adds that the law regulates how citizens may address one another in public, and that the bond of all human society is reason and speech. Four readings, all definitions, and every one of them puts talking at the center of the thing defined. Read them slowly. Everything in Parts Two and Three assumes them.

1. Aristotle, *Politics* 1.1–2; 3.1–5

The *Politics* is a treatise — Aristotle speaking in his own voice, in the compressed, unornamented prose of the works he kept for his school rather than published. It was written in the 330s BC at the school Aristotle founded in Athens after twenty years as Plato's pupil and a few as tutor to Alexander the Great: the Lyceum, named for the public gymnasium outside the city wall where he taught, and later called the Peripatetic school from the covered walk where its members talked. As a foreigner he could not own the ground; the school was his in the way a master's studio is his — the pupils, the program, and the work done under his name. The numbers in parentheses are the pages of the 1831 Berlin edition of Aristotle's complete works, edited by Immanuel Bekker, and are called Bekker numbers; they are the standard way to cite him; the book-and-chapter numbers are the ones in the margins here. There is no setting and no interlocutor; what you hear is a philosopher working through a problem in order, often correcting a predecessor, usually Plato.

Book 1.1–2 (1252a–1253a) is the foundation of the whole work. Aristotle begins with the thing itself — the city — and asks what it is for. His method is to take it apart into its components and watch them combine: the household, formed for daily needs; the village, formed from households; the city, formed from villages, and the first community large enough to be self-sufficient. Then the claim the book is built on: the city exists by nature, and man is by nature a political animal, because man alone has *logos* — articulate speech — while other animals have only voice. Voice signals pleasure and pain; speech declares what is useful and harmful, and so what is just and unjust; and a city is the partnership in that declaration. The rest of Book 1 goes on to the management of the household, which is why the selection stops where it does.

Book 3.1–5 (1274b–1278b) comes from the book in which Aristotle turns to the citizen and the constitution. Before asking what a constitution is, he asks who counts as a citizen, and rejects the obvious answers — residence, legal rights, descent — for a functional one: a citizen is one who shares in judging and in holding office, which in a

Greek city meant sitting in the assembly and the courts. He then asks whether the virtue of a good citizen is the same as the virtue of a good man, and answers that it depends on the constitution. Both passages give the civics student the first definitions in the book: a city is a partnership in speech about justice, and a citizen is one who takes part in it.

The English is Benjamin Jowett's, made at Oxford in 1885 for students who would read it alongside the Greek. It is clear, somewhat free, and reads as English prose rather than as a crib; where Aristotle's sentence is a fragment, Jowett quietly completes it.

Further reading (not in this volume): Politics 3.6–13, especially 3.11 on why the many deliberating together may judge better than the few; Books 4–6 on how real constitutions work and fail.

Aristotle, Politics 1.1–2; 3.1–5

Aristotle

1.1 ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὀρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὕσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἢ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλήθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἶον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἔτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν· καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεσθήκη, βασιλικόν, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικόν ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ)· δῆλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὁψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ρηθέντων.

Aristotle, Politics 1.1–2; 3.1–5

Aristotle

1.1 Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good. Now there is an erroneous opinion that a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman. But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what they differ from one another, and whether any scientific distinction can be drawn between the different kinds of rule.

1.2 εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἔνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ καὶ ἀρχόμενον φύσει, διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπῶν φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα πονεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτό συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν οὖν διώριστα τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν, πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἑν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δουλεῦον)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ βαρβάρων δ' Ἑλλήνας ἄρχειν εἰκός, ὥς ταῦτό φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναικὰ τε βοῦν τ' ἄροτῆρα· ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἔστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἶκός ἐστιν, οὓς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὁμοκάπους· ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι, οὓς καλοῦσιν τινες ὁμογάλακτας, παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖ-

1.2 He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place (1) there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; for example, of male and female, that the race may continue; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves. And (2) there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Nature, however, has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say,— ‘It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;’ as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one. Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the family first arises, and Hesiod is right when he says,— ‘First house and wife and an ox for the plough,’ for the ox is the poor man’s slave. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men’s every day wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas ‘companions of the cupboard’ [ὄμοσιπύους], and by Epimenides the Cretan, ‘companions of the manger’ [ὄμοκάπους]. But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said

δας. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη
 ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον· πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ
 πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι, διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν
 ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων. σποράδες
 γὰρ καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὥκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες
 φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον
 ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι,
 οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. ἢ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέ-
 λειος πόλις, ἥδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς ἀνταρκειᾶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν,
 γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὕσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύ-
 σει ἔστιν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἢ
 δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης,
 ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκί-
 ας. ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον· ἢ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος
 καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερόν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἢ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ
 ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ
 διὰ τύχην ἥτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος· ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ'
 Ὅμηρου λοιδορηθεὶς ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος· ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοι-
 οὔτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διό-
 τι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου
 ζώου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον

to be ‘suckled with the same milk.’ And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says [of the Cyclopes]:— ‘Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.’ For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own. When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the [completed] nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below it; he is the ‘Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,’ whom Homer denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone. Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only

δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι γὰρ τοῦτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερὸν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥστερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν λιθίνην (διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη), πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὠρίσται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δηλὸν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθεὶς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥστερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθεὶς νόμου καὶ δίκης χεῖριστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τὰναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδὴν χεῖριστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere sound is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state. Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they are no longer the same, but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, and the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.

3.1 τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἡ πόλις. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἱ δ' οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον· τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὀρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν, ἡ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅλων μὲν συνεστώτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πληθὸς ἐστίν. ὥστε τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκεπτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἔστι γὰρ ὅστις ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὢν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις οὐκ ἔστι πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως πως τυγχάνοντας ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, οἷον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον· ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ μέτοικοι καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει· πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην, ὥστε ἀτελῶς πως μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς μήπω δι' ἡλικίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους φατέον εἶναι μὲν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει δῆλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον). ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ λύειν. πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς

3.1 He who would enquire into the nature and various kinds of government must first of all determine ‘What is a state?’ At present this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has done a certain act; others, no, not the state, but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state; a constitution or government being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is composite, and, like any other whole, made up of many parts;—these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen in any other accidental manner, we may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place: nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. Even resident aliens in many places possess such rights, although in an imperfect form; for they are obliged to have a patron. Hence they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register, or to old men who have been relieved from state duties. Of these we do not say simply that they are citizens, but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the other, that they are past the age, or something of that sort; the precise expression is immaterial, for our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles. But the citizen, whom we are seeking to define, is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the ad-

οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστ' ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δις τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὠρισμένων χρόνων· ὁ δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστῆς καὶ ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους, οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀρχῆς καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτάτους ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδέν· περὶ ὀνόματος γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὴ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἀόριστος ἀρχή. τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα' ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἶδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν ἔνεστιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ προτέρας οὕσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας πῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἔσται φανερόν). ὥστε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἐκάστην πολιτείαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστα' ἐστὶ πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. ἐν ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δημῶς, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς, ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουνσι τὰς δίκας, ἀλλ' ἔχει διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής ἐστὶ καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὠρισμένος· τούτων γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ὧ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

ministration of justice, and in offices. Now of offices some have a limit of time, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval; others have no limit of time,—for example, the office of dicast or ecclesiast. It may, indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the supreme power do not govern. Not to dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question, what we want is a common term including both dicast and ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it ‘indefinite office,’ and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are generally so called. But we must not forget that things of which the underlying notions differ in kind, one of them being first, another second, another third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, or hardly anything, worth mentioning in common. Now we see that governments differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. (What we mean by perversion will be hereafter explained.) The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states. For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates. At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes are decided by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes. We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include these states. [But strictly taken it only applies in democracies.] In other states it is the holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things. The conception of the citizen now begins to clear up. He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.